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Abstract:  The first major reorganisation of the National Health Service took 
place in 1974, twenty-six years after the service had been established. It has long 
been perceived as a failure. This article draws on archival records and a witness 
seminar held in November 2016 to provide a more nuanced assessment of the 
1974 reorganisation and understand more fully why it took the form that it did. In 
particular it identifies the reorganisation as an important moment in the ongoing 
story of management consultants engaging with health policymakers, and explores 
the role of McKinsey and Co. in detail for the first time. Key explanatory factors 
for their involvement are identified, including the perceived lack of expertise and 
manpower inside the civil service and the NHS, and perceptions of their impact 
and effectiveness are discussed. Many debates about the use of management 
consultants today were directly foreshadowed during the early 1970s. Alongside 
this, the role of other groups of policy actors, including civil servants, politicians 
and medical professionals, are established and the extent to which British health 
policymakers have had to work within existing cultural, political, legislative and 
practical constraints when trying to initiate change is demonstrated. The fact that 
many of the ‘mistakes’ that were made have been repeated in the course of 
subsequent reforms, speaks to the poor institutional memory of Whitehall, and the 
Department of Health and Social Care in particular. In the run up to 1974 
management consultants could make only a limited contribution to an imperfect 
compromise. 
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Introduction 
 
Since its creation in 1948 the National Health Service [NHS] has been reformed many times. 
The basic principles which underpin it may remain the same, but its structures and processes 
have changed significantly. As Nicholas Timmins has noted, ‘‘organisation, re-organisation 
and re-disorganisation’ might well be dubbed the NHS disease’.1 This article examines the 
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first major reorganisation of the service in 1974. In particular it identifies the reorganisation 
as an important moment in the ongoing story of management consultants engaging with 
health policymakers. The use of management consultants has increased significantly over 
time. They have since become culturally embedded in the NHS and in Whitehall; able to 
replace or supersede internal expertise, make connections with policymakers (including 
Ministers and their special advisers), and take advantage of the opportunities presented by 
managerial and market-oriented reform and the development of a normative culture in which 
external consultants have a significant role. This rise has had implications for the quality, 
cost and accountability of advice, as well as wider issues around health policy formation and 
public governance in Britain. It has been underpinned by the perception that management 
consultants are able to understand complex institutional change and offer worldwide policy 
learning across organisations and between the public and private sectors.2 There is also a 
tangible sense in which the use of management consultants serves to add prestige and 
legitimacy to official decisions or can help to redistribute attention and responsibility when 
addressing difficult questions.3  
In 2014 it was widely reported that spending on consultants had reached £640m per 
year.4 That figure has since fallen as part of wider spending constraints, but consultants 
remain important players. For example, they have come to have a key role in the 
development of Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships.5 Yet the 1974 reorganisation 
appears to be the first time that management consultants were engaged at such a high level on 
a project of such importance in the health field. Strikingly, the work of McKinsey & Co., the 
management consultancy firm employed by the Department of Health and Social Security 
[DHSS] during the preparations for the 1974 reorganisation, has almost become synonymous 
with the reforms. Even Kenneth Clarke, who became Secretary of State for Health in 1988, 
has referred to the ‘stupid McKinsey report’ and the ‘McKinsey reforms’.6 However, it has 
not always been clear what McKinsey’s contribution actually was.  
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In historiographical terms, the reorganisation and its many political and 
organisational developments, have long been well covered in histories of the NHS by Charles 
Webster, Geoffrey Rivett, Rudolf Klein and others.7 The 1973 National Health Service 
Reorganisation Act replaced the original tripartite structure, which had separated primary 
care, secondary care and local health services, with a more integrated model which brought 
services together under new Regional and Area Health Authorities and District Management 
Teams.8 Meaningful progress was achieved, but integration was not complete and significant 
gaps remained, whilst new problems were created.  
Important contemporary accounts were published by Ruth Levitt and Ronald Brown.9  
Levitt documented the changes in great detail in 1976, including the myriad roles and 
responsibilities of the new layers of administration, and the implications for different medical 
services, NHS staff and the public. Tellingly, she also identified a number of ‘unresolved 
problems’ around planning and collaboration.10 By 1978 Brown was able to provide further 
details on the ‘machinery of change’ and had conducted a field study in Humberside which 
highlighted delays in filling new posts and practical difficulties around establishing the 
necessary professional machinery. According to Brown, ‘The central architects of 
reorganisation gave a great deal of thought to new structures and processes as a vehicle for 
change, but not nearly enough to people, inducements and tools’.11 Subsequent studies like 
that by Jane Lewis have also demonstrated a resulting decline in ‘community medicine’ and a 
negative impact on public health, while Stephen Harrison documented the problematic nature 
of ‘consensus management’, a central element of the reforms which is discussed in more 
detail in below.12  
As such, the 1974 reorganisation has been widely remembered as a failure. A witness 
seminar held in 2016 largely confirmed this view.13 Klein’s observation that ‘the attempt to 
please everyone satisfied no one’ also speaks to the well-established perception in the 
literature that the reorganisation was a product of compromise between different interest 
groups – civil servants, medical professionals, and NHS staff.14 However, despite the volume 
of material on the 1974 reorganisation, the involvement of McKinsey has only ever been 
discussed relatively briefly. How do we square this with the fact that more widely the firm 
have come to be so closely associated with the reforms and their failure? There has not yet 
been a detailed account of McKinsey’s role. This article examines it in depth and 
demonstrates that this sense of synonymity is not necessarily well founded. Nonetheless, it 
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also shows that although McKinsey were not yet performing the wide ranging and more 
controversial role that management consultants would take on in future, many debates about 
the use of external consultants today – the lack of expertise inside the NHS, the apparent lack 
of accountability and responsibility, cost and pressure on resources, dependency and the 
quality of consultancy advice – were directly foreshadowed during the early 1970s. Such 
concerns were present much earlier than has so far been appreciated. 
Alongside this, the article provides a new and more nuanced account of why the 
reorganisation took the form that it did. It achieves this by analysing the context of the period 
and the institutional cultures inherent to health policymaking at the time, examining the 
different motives of those involved and the forces pulling them in different directions. It 
draws on underused archival records and the 2016 witness seminar which – whilst several 
important figures had sadly passed away during the intervening period – brought together 
twelve invited participants – medical professionals, civil servants, government ministers, 
NHS administrators and former McKinsey consultants who were directly involved in the 
reorganisation or experienced it first-hand. It was chaired by Nicholas Timmins, a social 
policy journalist and historian, and followed a semi-structured agenda over four hours. Three 
McKinsey representatives participated: Robert Maxwell, Christopher Stewart-Smith and 
James Lee. Methodologically, the witness seminar allowed individual memories to be shared 
and contested in order to construct a fresh analysis of the 1974 reorganisation. The witnesses 
discussed the origins of the reforms, their introduction, effects and subsequent legacy. In the 
audience there were a further twenty individuals who also contributed their views during 
open discussion. Additional oral history interviews were also conducted, including with 
McKinsey consultants Henry Strage and John Banham. 
As will be discussed, the reforms were influenced by broad conceptions of post-war 
planning and rationalisation, and an openness to, what were perceived to be outside expert 
voices, such as management consultants.15 However, this was often underpinned by practical 
rather than philosophical considerations. McKinsey were only one of several expert groups 
feeding into the policymaking process. The importance of different types of policy actors to 
the 1974 NHS reorganisation has not yet been fully appreciated. This article underlines the 
extent to which health policymakers in Britain have often had to work within cultural, 
political, legislative and practical constraints when trying to initiate change.  Whilst working 
alongside civil servants and representatives of the health service and the medical professions 
for example, management consultants could make only a limited contribution to an 
ultimately imperfect compromise.  
 
 
Reform on the Agenda 
 
The tripartite structure of the NHS established in 1948 was itself a product of compromise. 
While the inter-war years had seen a growing recognition on the part of health policymakers 
that greater efficiency, better treatment and wider coverage, required a move to a 
comprehensive national health service, it took much longer to convince the medical 
profession, who had long been hostile to any new service being under local government 
control lest it should undermine clinical independence. In Webster’s words, ‘Intractable 
medico-realities stood in the path of enlightened planning goals’.16 After the groundwork laid 
by the wartime coalition government, particularly the 1942 Beveridge Report, Aneurin 
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Bevan, Labour Minister of Health from 1945, succeeded in pushing through a significant 
degree of integration and effective nationalisation, at least with regards to the hospital 
service. The nettle of bringing General Practitioners [GPs] into the NHS as salaried doctors 
and creating a fully integrated system was not grasped. Bevan compromised with senior 
doctors and ‘stuffed their mouths with gold’ to secure a settlement.17 GPs retained their 
position as independent contractors and were organised instead under separate Executive 
Councils. Public health remained the responsibility of local government. Though a 
significant step forward, the tripartite structure introduced in 1948 left plenty of scope for 
disorganisation. 
The lack of communication produced by the separation of hospital and community 
services was particularly felt in services for the elderly and expectant mothers.18 Nonetheless, 
assessments of the early years of the NHS have usually been positive, not least in comparison 
to the fragmented service it replaced. According to Webster: 
 
It was a remarkable improvement on the chaotic market arrangements that had 
existed before the Second World War. Despite evident shortcomings in the new 
system and the handicap of an environment of severe austerity, the regional 
hospital service succeeded in keeping up with the demands of modernisation and 
record of achievement, despite all of its idiosyncrasies.19 
 
The most significant problem appeared to be that the early NHS might be the victim of its 
own success. The demand for new treatments and services had been underestimated, with the 
disparity between public take-up and official expectations made worse by the necessarily 
tight funding constraints of the post-war period. However, the 1956 Guillebaud Report, 
commissioned to examine the long-term financial viability of the NHS, concluded that the 
demographic and resulting financial pressure could largely be alleviated by better funding 
and greater management oversight in the running of the service.20 It did not yet prescribe a 
fundamental reorganisation. Debates about the future of the NHS continued to bubble under 
the surface. 
By the mid-1960s pressure began to build for reform. The 1962 Porritt Report, 
produced by representatives of the leading medical organisations, called for a more unified 
service.21 Arthur Porritt himself was President of the British Medical Association and the 
Royal College of Surgeons. The report’s recommendations demonstrated the extent to which 
the settlement reached in 1948 was seen as imperfect and ultimately dispensable by senior 
doctors. As the Porritt Report confirmed, the tripartite foundations of the NHS were not set in 
stone:  
 
The most vital need is to unify and integrate, in the widest sense, all aspects of 
medicine in order to achieve the highest standard of medical care and to avoid the 
sense of isolation and frustration to which we have drawn attention. Co-
ordination and understanding between the profession and the administration is 
essential. No service can thrive if there is not a genuine partnership between these 
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two vital elements. Our review has convinced us that a major fault in the National 
Health Service is its present tripartite administration, for this has led to 
difficulties in co-ordination and co-operation.22  
 
The best available answer to these problems, whilst retaining the elements of the NHS that 
were popular and worked well, was, it was argued, integration of all the medical and 
ancillary services in a geographical area under a series of autonomous Area Health Boards. 
On the ground there was also growing recognition of the need for reform. Dr John 
Marks, then a GP in Boreham Wood and Chairman of Hertfordshire Executive Council, 
described at the witness seminar how he saw integration as being ‘desperately’ needed:  
 
We had a tripartite system and one third did not know what the other two thirds 
were doing and vice versa…I did not have a clue what was going on in the 
hospitals, and as for the public health, they were a different world.23  
 
The development of new towns particularly exposed the deficiencies of the existing 
structure. Dr Geoffrey Rivett, later a senior official at the Department of Health, but a GP in 
Bletchley in the late 1960s, was impressed by the local Medical Officer of Health [MOH] 
who brought together a group of local GPs, health authority and hospital representatives to 
plan medical services for Milton Keynes.24 Progressive MOHs were able to find ways to 
operate within the system to the benefit of their local community, for example moving local 
authority staff such as health visitors into GP surgeries.25 But not every area could boast 
individual leaders who found ways to make things work. 
Recognition of the need for change was also seeping into the political sphere. By the 
late 1960s David Owen, a Labour MP, qualified doctor and future Minister of Health, had 
begun to strongly criticise the ‘tripartite monster’ which was holding back patient care.26 The 
slow development of community care facilities and relative lack of improvement in 
psychiatric hospitals were particular concerns, particularly after scandals such as that at the 
Ely Hospital in Cardiff.27 
There were also moves to try and ‘modernise’ the NHS in a wider sense, which 
culminated in a series of reports and initiatives during 1967. The Salmon Report sought to 
improve the way hospitals were run by giving more power to nurses and encouraging senior 
nurses to become managers, and the first Cogwheel Report aimed to improve the 
organisation of doctors in hospitals by introducing specialist groups.28 Both recognised the 
difficulties thrown up by the tripartite system. 
In 1968 the Minister of Health, Kenneth Robinson, announced that the structure of 
the NHS would finally be studied alongside an expected reorganisation of local government. 
The 1969 Redcliffe-Maud Report formed a significant part of the wider post-war discourse 
around planning, and with local government reform came a natural expectation of 
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complementary reform to the NHS.29 A long-term study group was established which helped 
to produce the first reorganisation Green Paper.30 It proposed replacing Hospital 
Management Committees and Regional Hospital Boards with between forty and fifty Area 
Boards which would unify and administer all health services in England and Wales. A new 
focus on management was at the heart of the proposals, with little emphasis placed on the 
involvement of medical professionals in decision making.31 The ‘mood music’ of integration 
was clear.32 
But objections were quickly raised by senior doctors who once again feared being 
brought under the control of local government. Robinson’s plans were subsequently 
abandoned in a second Green Paper published in 1970 by Richard Crossman, who had 
become Secretary of State at the new Department of Health and Social Security [DHSS] in 
1968.33 Ninety Area Health Authorities [AHAs] were now proposed which would match the 
boundaries of the ninety new local authorities; a process known as co-terminosity. The AHAs 
would be the main centres of administration, supplemented by fourteen Regional Councils 
with a planning and advisory role, but which sat outside the main chain of command. There 
would also be two hundred District Committees, which would bring in an element of local 
representation. The earlier managerial focus was now superseded by acceptance of the need 
for wider representation of clinicians on the boards of the new authorities.34 
However, Crossman did not have a chance to see the reforms through. After Labour 
lost office in June 1970, Sir Keith Joseph, the incoming Secretary of State, took on the 
reforms. Changes were made in areas where the Conservatives disagreed with Labour. 
Despite such differences however, a sufficient modicum of consensus existed between the 
two main political parties, leading representatives of the medical profession and NHS staff. 
As local government reform continued apace, a 1971 Consultative Document retained the 
idea of moving local authority services into new Area authorities with coterminous 
boundaries with local government, but a stronger, integrated, Regional tier was also 
introduced.35 This, it was hoped, would create a buffer between the powerful new AHAs, 
which would have an overview of all their local service needs, and those further up the chain 
(politicians and civil servants in DHSS) who would likely have different priorities.36 
Teaching Hospitals and public health services would also now be under the control of the 
AHAs, but local government retained its environmental health role. GPs were to remain 
separate as independent contractors under new Family Practitioner Committees. Once again, 
that particular ‘integration’ nettle was left un-grasped. 
 
 
The Management Study 
 
Ahead of the publication of a White Paper which would set out the detailed case for 
reorganisation, DHSS initiated a ‘management study’ to make recommendations for the 
internal organisation and management processes of the new Regional, Area and District 
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levels.37 A further working party looked at collaboration between the health authorities and 
local authorities.38 Civil servants were well aware of the size of the administrative task they 
faced and called in reinforcements. 
A great deal of thought went into the composition of the steering committee which 
oversaw the management study. Members were drawn from across the different civil service 
divisions in DHSS, and, although nominally invited by the Secretary of State in an individual 
capacity, representatives of different parts of the NHS were handpicked. Whilst the final 
administrative decisions were to be taken by civil servants, bringing others in worked on two 
levels: 
 
NHS Authorities and officers must be closely associated with the arrangements, 
with the double object of making sure that the recommendations make NHS sense 
and at the same time of giving the DHSS’ final decisions a greater authority than 
they otherwise would have.39 
 
William Naylor of Sheffield Regional Hospital Board was earmarked early on for the 
RHB Secretary spot because of his managerial approach and interest in reform, which was 
known to officials.40 Elizabeth Few, Chief Nursing Officer in Buckinghamshire, was 
recommended for the local authority CNO position.41 P.M. Cooke, Group Secretary of 
Ipswich Group Hospital Management Committee, was recommended for his position.42 
Civil servants from across DHSS were also anxious that their own Divisions would be 
represented. Andrew Collier, Under Secretary in the Community Health Services Division, 
approached his colleagues and asked to be included.43 Admiral William Holgate of the 
Dental Division pointed out that there was no dentist on the steering committee and ended up 
getting the job himself.44 Dr H.G. Jones provided a link to the working party on collaboration 
with local government. The Permanent Secretary of DHSS, Sir Philip Rogers, chaired the 
committee. 
The steering committee oversaw a smaller ‘study group’, chaired by F.D.K. Williams, 
Assistant Secretary in the H3 Division, which did most of the detailed policy work. The 
apparent openness to external expertise and corporate ideas was demonstrated by the 
inclusion of Sir Richard Meyjes, head of marketing at Shell, who had been part of an 
influential group of business leaders appointed by Conservative Prime Minister Edward 
Heath to help improve civil service efficiency.45 Most importantly however, the study group  
received expert advice from Brunel University’s Health Services Organization Research 
Unit, led by the influential Professor of Sociology Elliott Jaques, and management 
consultants from McKinsey & Co. 
 
 
The McKinsey Moment? 
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 US management consultants had followed leading US companies in expanding into Europe 
during the 1950s, selling American management ‘know-how’ to European companies 
anxious to learn how their new competitors were organised.46 The expansion of McKinsey 
was particularly important in Britain. They had considered and decided against a London 
office as early as 1953 and planned to work primarily for US subsidiaries, but this changed 
after increased demand from European companies on the back of prestigious work for high 
profile clients such as Shell and IBM. The London office was established in 1959 and by 
1966 it was the group’s second largest.47 The multidivisional corporate structure was at the 
heart of their success. The firm was widely known in Britain by the late 1960s. Publicity 
accompanied the work done for famous British companies such as Dunlop, ICI, Cadbury, 
Cunard, Vickers, Tate and Lyle, Unilever and Rolls Royce. In the public sector British Rail, 
the BBC, the Bank of England and the Post Office also employed McKinsey for advice about 
restructuring.48 
In the healthcare field, British consultancy firms had been advising individual 
hospitals about improving efficiency on a small scale since at least the early 1950s. The 
Ministry of Health had allowed a number of pro bono pilot studies in the NHS in 1958 and 
Urwick Orr were used to advise their architects on efficient systems for the Best Buy 
Hospital Scheme.49 At this stage however, civil servants were cautious about the use of 
consultants, not wanting to undermine the autonomy of local hospitals or their responsibility 
for implementing their own efficiency measures. The use of management consultants was 
noteworthy but contained.  
An important moment then came in 1968 when the Board of the Oxford United 
Hospitals, invited McKinsey to look into their financial difficulties. The Chairman Eric 
Towler, head of the oil distributors Cawood’s, wanted to know whether they were 
underfunded or inefficient and badly managed. McKinsey concluded that it was ‘a bit of 
both’; there were grounds for thinking they were underfunded in relation to similar hospitals, 
and also that they were not very well managed.50 The proposed solution was to cut 
expenditure (one hospital was closed and its work absorbed elsewhere) and to strengthen 
management (a new organisational structure with a greater emphasis on clinical participation 
was designed).51 Small but impactful changes to hospital routines were introduced: starting 
the work of the x-ray department an hour earlier each day; customising the size of 
prescription dispensing containers to reduce waste. McKinsey’s reports also advised seeking 
opportunities for raising revenue, such as introducing car park charges. By considering 
questions of finance and management at a much broader level the Oxford study was different 
in character and scope to those previously carried out by management consultants in the 
health care sector. NHS consultancy work represented a new direction for McKinsey. Special 
permission to undertake the study had to be sought from head office in New York.52 It was 
led by Robert Maxwell who was developing an interest in the healthcare sector. He later 
worked as an Administrator at St Thomas’ Hospital and was Secretary and Chief Executive 
of the King’s Fund from 1980 to 1997. Though still only a small operation, the experience 
gained by the firm in Oxford was important. 
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Favourable publicity was secured when Maxwell wrote about the study in the British 
Journal of Hospital Medicine in 1969 and the story was picked up by the national press.53 
Towler, along with the hospital administrator John Spencer and one of the consultant 
physicians Peter Sleight also produced an article for the British Medical Journal.54 They 
highlighted the advantages of using McKinsey - a team that had ‘time to study problems in 
depth’, and suggested that ‘the medical and administrative staff are far more likely to adopt a 
plan suggested by a disinterested outsider than one proposed from some internal group’.55 
They described the McKinsey team as ‘three or four highly paid intelligent and sympathetic 
young men’ and praised their continuing interest in the Oxford NHS hospitals: 
 
Their representatives continued to come to our committee meetings for 
many months after to make sure that our discussions were taking the right course, 
and that the changes they had recommended were being carried out, and that the 
administrative structure was running smoothly … They have done a difficult job 
intelligently and sympathetically. We hope this honeymoon period gives rise to a 
stable marriage.56 
 
During the early 1970s Maxwell then worked for McKinsey on a reorganisation of 
health services in the Republic of Ireland, a separation of public hospitals from the City 
administration in New York, and a study of psychiatric hospitals in the Netherlands.57 The 
firm first worked for DHSS on an internal study of its own organisation.58 Whilst Social 
Security was thought to be well administered, the Health side was seen as ill prepared to 
manage the NHS after the planned reorganisation. The professional medical staff and non-
professional civil servants had traditionally been kept separate with different responsibilities. 
Now they were brought closer together through joint working, whilst Regional Divisions and 
a Central Planning Unit were introduced to strengthen national policymaking.59 Again, 
Maxwell led for McKinsey, liaising with the civil servant Ronald Matthews at DHSS. 
In May 1971 McKinsey were subsequently invited to take part in the management 
study. They were chosen for their management expertise and because they were seen to add 
an ‘American flavour’.60 As discussed, consultancy firms founded in the US were 
increasingly successful in making their overseas advice appealing to British companies and 
public bodies during the 1960s.  It was also recognised that there was insufficient internal 
support available. Even if it had been, civil servants judged that this ‘would not command 
public confidence in the same way as would the employment of consultants’.61 It was hoped 
that outside advice would be seen as independent and objective, and therefore more readily 
received if it touched upon complex and difficult questions. 
Ultimately however, the decision to go with McKinsey was underpinned by the fact 
that they were already known to the department: 
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Granted the case for employing outside consultants, the logic of using 
McKinsey’s seems to us indefeasible. First, there is the intrinsic value of the 
experience gained in their recent study of the Irish National Health Service and of 
hospitals in the USA we well as in our own NHS (in which they seem to us to 
have the edge on other leading consultants). Second there is the point that the 
management structure of the NHS must be complementary to that of the 
Department and this can most easily be achieved if the same consultants are 
working with us on both.62  
 
Whilst the work on the departmental study was put out for competitive tender, with 
McKinsey winning out over four other firms, that on the management study was not. 
Time was a key factor. Work on the required legislation was already underway and it 
was hoped that the management study would be completed inside eighteen months.63 A 
general view of how the process was likely to unfold was expected ahead of the publication 
of the White Paper planned for later in 1971. Permission had to be sought from the Civil 
Service Department [CSD] which monitored the use of consultants, but civil servants pushed 
hard for McKinsey to be used again. 
CSD were primarily concerned with expenditure. As such, they pressed for the study 
group to make the greatest possible use of civil servants and for the inclusion of the Brunel 
representatives, Jaques and Professor Maurice Kogan, who were seen as important 
participants. Their paper ‘The Future Structure of the National Health Service: Comments on 
the Second Green Paper’ was well known to civil servants. As John Archer of CSD noted: 
 
I know that he [Jacques] and Professor Kogan have staff working with them with 
experience of studies in the NHS and I have personally been impressed by the 
quality of some of Kogan’s writings on the subject of NHS organisation. It might 
both reduce the cost and bring fresh minds with rather different backgrounds to 
bear if there were some participation from this source at the study group level.64 
 
The Brunel team were also thought to bring a degree of academic objectivity and had 
previous experience of working with complex organisations and the issue of ‘sapiential 
authority’.65 
The individual consultants put forward by McKinsey were interviewed beforehand. 
Most were relatively junior, in their twenties or thirties. They included John Banham, who 
went on to be Director General of the Confederation of British Industry, and James Lee who 
moved on to a career in the media, including as Chairman of the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism. The Engagement Director overseeing McKinsey’s involvement – the Partner 
responsible for all the work undertaken – was the American Henry Strage. Robert Maxwell 
concentrated on the internal study of the Department, but also attended meetings of the study 
group on a regular basis. The first Engagement Manager for the project was Christopher 
Stewart-Smith, a future Chairman of the British Chambers of Commerce. 
McKinsey initially quoted a figure of £11,000 per month for the services of three full 
time consultants and others when required on a part time basis, which was negotiated down 
to £10,000.66 The study was divided into three phases – ‘development of a feasible range of 
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alternative organisational and process hypotheses’, ‘testing of hypotheses’, and 
‘implementation’ – with McKinsey initially employed for Phase I which would last six 
months. The motives of civil servants in this regard were interesting. As Archer of CSD 
noted, ‘There was, I admit, the presentational point made that if we have to answer a PQ 
[Parliamentary Question] about this new assignment, we could at this stage say that only 
£60,000 had been committed’.67 But he also confidently expected that McKinsey would not 
be needed for the full eighteen months of the study. 
By December 1971 the firm’s fees had consistently come in at around £6,000 a 
month, but this subsequently increased, and the slack in the overall budget was taken up once 
extra consultants were added during Phase II.68 Not everything was completed on time, but 
sufficient progress was made, so that a little after the expected end of Phase II in July 1972 
the proposed management arrangements were agreed by the steering committee and put 
forward to Secretary of State, Sir Keith Joseph. The result of the exercise was the famous 
‘Grey Book’, Management Arrangements for the Reorganised National Health Service, 
which was published in September 1972.69 
The Grey Book described in detail the functions of each new tier of the NHS and the 
duties and responsibilities of twenty-seven new roles. Members of the Regional Health 
Authorities were to be appointed by the Secretary of State. RHA staff included a medical 
officer, a nurse, a works officer, a treasurer and an administrator. Their main function was 
planning. Members of the Area Health Authorities were appointed by representatives of the 
RHAs, local authorities, and members of non-medical and nursing staff. The Chairman was 
appointed by the Secretary of State. Their staff included a medical officer, a nurse, a treasurer 
and an administrator. They had planning and management functions and aimed to develop 
services with their corresponding local authority. Most areas were split into Health Districts, 
with each District Management Team comprising an elected consultant, an elected GP, a 
community physician, a nurse, an administrator and a finance officer. They would manage 
and co-ordinate everyday services. An array of statutory and non-statutory professional 
advisory committees would also ensure professional involvement.70 
The Grey Book also outlined the philosophy underpinning the new management 
arrangements at each level. Multidisciplinary teams would follow a process of ‘consensus 
management’. Each officer would be equal and decisions would be made collectively. If 
agreement could not be reached then issues would be passed up the chain: ‘delegation 
downwards should be matched by accountability upwards’.71 
Once the Grey Book had been published, DHSS civil servants were aware of the need 
to respond to the ‘strong and growing demand from the Service for leadership’.72 Phase III, 
which focussed on implementation and communication, therefore included attempts to share 
progress and explain the reorganisation plans to doctors, nurses, dentists, administrators and 
professional groups across the country. Such a process had been foreshadowed in the White 
Paper, and a series of seminars and conferences were organised, with the aim of boosting 
morale. Six universities were signed up and expected to reach more than two thousand senior 
health officials.73 McKinsey played an important role in this ‘management education 
programme’ providing speakers, principally John Banham and James Lee, and materials for 
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integration and training courses.74 This in particular may have helped to tie the McKinsey 
name to the reorganisation. Banham was also retained in a reduced role to advise on ongoing 
planning issues. He has subsequently suggested that NHS staff were about as well prepared 
as they could have been for the significant disruption that was coming.75 
Aside from these expected roles, Strage tried unsuccessfully to get the full McKinsey 
team kept on for Stage III. His conception that the firm was needed in order to train DHSS 
officers to carry out the complex reforms was popular amongst some leading civil servants.76 
But, as will be discussed below, others remained unconvinced and McKinsey’s role was 
slowly phased out within the eighteen month timeframe of the study. 
 
 
The Reorganisation in Practice 
 
The National Health Service Reorganisation Act reached the statute book in July 1973. 
‘Shadow authorities’ were established to prepare for implementation and begin to make 
appointments, taking over from a series of local Joint Liaison Committees.77 The new 
structures came into effect on 1 April 1974. By then Labour’s Barbara Castle had replaced 
Sir Keith Joseph as Secretary of State for Health and Social Services after a snap general 
election that February. She was more sceptical about the proposed changes than her 
predecessors, and within the first week of taking office had to decide whether to go ahead 
with the reforms. In a crucial meeting, the DHSS Permanent Secretary Sir Philip Rogers laid 
out the options. According to David Owen, newly appointed as Minister of Health: 
 
He [Rogers] presented the case in considerable detail.  The meeting must have 
been at least an hour and [he] very forcefully but pretty fairly presented this 
machinery that was being built up and everything like that, and then he ended and 
said, ‘Secretary of State, we are here to do what you want.  It is possible to stop it.  
I have given you every form of argument why it would be very difficult but if you 
decide to do it we will loyally follow it through’.78 
 
Castle decided that there was no alternative but to let the reorganisation continue. ‘Chaos’ 
would likely have ensued otherwise.79 Small changes were made to try and make the 
structures more ‘democratic’, including increasing the number of local authority 
representatives at the Area level.80 The option of removing the regional tier or making it 
advisory was discounted after it was discovered how far the implementation plans had 
already progressed. Thus, although there were differences between the two main political 
parties, they were in relation to the details of change not the overall principle, and they did 
not have a significant impact on the course of the reorganisation. The practical constraints 
that British health policymakers often find themselves working within are also clear. With 
regards to management consultants, it is likely that a Conservative government was 
instinctively more comfortable working with them, but there had long been a cross-party 
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appreciation of the need for better management in the NHS, and their role in the healthcare 
field was relatively confined and much less contentious than it would later become, during 
the early 1970s.  
However, the reorganisation did not prove to be a durable solution to many of the 
problems which the NHS faced. The ‘dry rot of disillusionment’ soon appeared.81 A Royal 
Commission, chaired by Sir Alec Merrison, was established in 1976 to once again evaluate 
the long-term viability of the service. It heard evidence of increased bureaucracy, delays in 
taking difficult decisions, and strained relationships between the administrative tiers.82 
Conflict between the new FPCs and AHAs was common.83 In their evidence to the 
Commission even McKinsey admitted that the 1974 reorganisation had led to a ‘proliferation 
of paper’.84 In an evidence session in June 1978, John Banham summed up much that was 
thought to have gone wrong with the reforms: 
 
With hindsight, it would have been better to have: 
 
a) avoided the creation of both area and district levels of management; 
b) had more discussion on whether there was a real role for the Regional 
tier; 
c) removed the requirement that areas should have the same boundaries as 
local government, and established a series of single-district areas; 
d) tested the reorganised management structure in, say, one region before 
adopting the plan nationally; 
e) had better selection arrangements for top jobs in the reorganised 
structure.85 
 
Maxwell had also conceded that ‘It [was] very sad… that we did not do more trials of 
alternative forms of NHS reorganisation’, which would have provided ‘a better basis for the 
final form of the service’.86 Avoidable problems included ‘anxiety generated among staff of 
all disciplines by the handling of their translation from old to new appointments’ and 
‘uncertainty in administrative units about their power and functions’. More widely he 
diagnosed a state of ‘anomie’ (‘spiritual impoverishment characterized by confusion and 
aimlessness’) in the NHS.87 It was, Maxwell argued, ‘in real peril’, partly as a result of 
‘clumsy reorganisation’, but also due to other factors including the ‘militancy’ of NHS staff, 
‘doctrinaire political attitudes’ and ‘chronic under-financing’.88 One potential answer was the 
introduction of non-medical chief executives in order to offset concerns about weak decision 
making, which had been tried in the Republic of Ireland. By the early 1970s such an idea had 
been around in health policy circles for some time, but it was rejected by the Steering 
Committee, as it had been at other times, as potentially representing an unacceptable 
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challenge to medical authority.89 Once the 1974 reorganisation was complete therefore 
McKinsey representatives were willing to voice their frustrations, and in doing so provided 
an insight into the kinds of thinking, often quite dramatic thinking, that had not taken hold, or 
not been allowed to emerge at all, during the management study. Maxwell himself, outside of 
project constraints, was engaged in much broader thinking about the challenges facing the 
NHS and ensuring it had a viable future, including difficult issues such as health care 
rationing and levels of public spending.90 
Following the publication of the Royal Commission’s report and a return to 
Conservative government in May 1979, a series of further reorganisations took place. Area 
Health Authorities were abolished in 1982. Consensus management was replaced by ‘general 
management’ after the 1983 Griffiths NHS management inquiry. An NHS Management 
Board was created in 1985 and an NHS Executive in 1989. The internal market was 
introduced in 1991. Further local and regional reconfigurations followed regularly 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, while the most recent, the 2012 Health and Social Care Act, 
created Clinical Commissioning Groups. Little evidence of those first significant changes in 
1974 remains. 
 
 
‘We Have Got a Problem’ 
 
One of the most intriguing aspects of the 1974 reorganisation is the extent to which many of 
those involved could see problems emerging soon after its completion, or even while it was 
still being planned. It was only natural that in an organisation as large and complex as the 
NHS the reorganisation would not be completely successful, but many of its weaknesses 
were built in from the start. 
Timing was a key issue. When reflecting on the management study in 1975 the DHSS 
civil servant F.D.K. Williams was already clear that: 
 
Ideally the study should have been undertaken at an earlier stage of planning NHS 
reorganisation. This was not possible for political reasons. Accordingly the 
framework for reorganisation was decided before the study was commissioned. 
The consultants showed themselves able to work within this framework, though it 
was less than ideal.91 
 
In this respect, we can see reflections of ongoing concerns about health policymaking being 
subject to a political timetable that does not align with the interests of the service itself. 
Reform appeared feasible because there was a sufficient measure of agreement between the 
two main political parties and key interest groups. There was a sense of inevitability behind 
the reforms. They were part of an evolutionary process. But in the short term they were still 
subject to unavoidable political and legislative calculations. Health reform is routinely on the 
political agenda, because of the enduring imperfection of the NHS and perpetual uncertainty 
about its future. There may not be a perfect time for change in the NHS, but restrictive 
deadlines can particularly hamper successful policymaking. The infamous ‘pause’ of the 
coalition government’s NHS reforms in 2010 also points to this. 
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The outcome of the 1974 NHS reorganisation also speaks to the continuing power of 
the medical profession. It was a compromise. As long as doctors’ opposition to more radical 
changes remained strong there was no serious possibility of considering options such as 
moving all health services under local government control or introducing non-medical chief 
executives. At the beginning of the management study Joseph had made clear his ‘intention 
of constructing the strongest management structure consistent with…the preservation of 
clinical freedom’.92 In the event, the strength of the management structure was debateable. 
With the advent of consensus management medical professionals may even have ended up 
with more of a voice in the running of the service than they had before.93 
The issue of accountability and where it truly lay – another perennial theme in NHS 
history – was not adequately addressed during the 1974 reorganisation. As Klein observes, 
‘The rhetoric was all about accountability and monitoring. But what was the currency of 
accountability and where were the tools of monitoring?’94 These are difficult concepts to pin 
down, particularly in a large and complex organisation like the NHS, but on the ground, in 
the hospitals and clinics, the reorganisation created uncertainty. Although doctors were 
clinically accountable to their Executive Council and the General Medical Council, it was not 
made clear who was ultimately responsible for the successful running of services. Indeed, no 
one figure was responsible. This ‘problem’ was quickly returned to by the NHS Management 
Inquiry in 1983, exemplified by Roy Griffith’s famous observation that ‘if Florence 
Nightingale were carrying her lamp through the corridors of the NHS today she would almost 
certainly be searching for the people in charge’.95 But in 1974, discussion of accountability 
was ‘relatively meaningless’. As DHSS civil servant Eric Caines has noted, ‘When everyone 
is responsible no one is responsible’.96 Questions of who is ultimately responsible for NHS 
outcomes, and particularly who is being held accountable for the successful planning and 
implementation of wide ranging reforms, have been asked again during recent attempts at 
NHS reform.97 
Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that the consensus management compromise 
arrived at in 1974 was actually seen as a positive in areas that were well suited to it. For 
example, Bob Nicholls, then District Administrator in Southampton and South West 
Hampshire, and later an influential Regional General Manager, recalls that ‘overall 
consensus management worked very well for us’.98 Questions of theoretical accountability 
mattered less when issues could be resolved. However, as before, this was often a result of 
local circumstances and the work of strong leaders on the ground. In the majority of places 
that were not prepared and had not already been doing something similar on an informal 
basis, consensus management could be a ‘shock’ or even a ‘disaster’.99 
Another significant, but under-appreciated rationale for the reorganisation was that it 
would simply help to save money. Financial pressures have been a recurrent theme 
throughout the history of the NHS. Sir Keith Joseph was interested in modernisation but he 
was also aware of the bottom line. Caines recalls that, ‘He was handling a big budget on 
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Social Security and an insufficient budget on Health and it was a time of financial crisis.  
There was a real practical edge to his desire to get this thing moving’.100 Although the 
primary aim was integration, if the financial pressures on the NHS could also be eased in the 
medium term, all the better. 
The 1974 reorganisation also illuminates a number of important points about the use of 
management consultants in the health sphere. The involvement of McKinsey consultants in 
the management study speaks directly to current questions about why consultants are hired 
by health policymakers, the quality of their work, their specialist knowledge of and concern 
for health policy, the relative lack of expertise inside the NHS and the civil service, the 
potential lack of accountability and responsibility attached to consultancy work, its cost and 
wider pressures on resources, and the ways in which it can be used to add legitimacy to 
decisions making processes. 
From 1968 CSD had kept track of work done by consultants for government 
departments. In March 1972, Management Services Branch 1, responsible for this monitoring 
in DHSS, asked for a ‘frank assessment of the value’ of McKinsey’s involvement in the 
management study.101 Caines argued that this would be ‘inappropriate’ while the study was 
still ongoing.102 A second attempt in February 1973 saw Williams reflect on McKinsey’s 
flexibility and methodical approach.103 When a further request came through in February 
1974 Williams, who had since moved on inside DHSS, was more candid: 
 
With two exceptions the consultants work tended to be superficial. This was 
hardly surprising considering the complexity and the extent of the field they had 
to deal with in a comparatively short time.104 
 
By the time McKinsey were invited to take part in the management study in May 1971 
many of the most important questions had already been closed off. Christopher Stewart-
Smith quickly came to wonder why Sir Keith Joseph had hired McKinsey to implement 
decisions that had already been taken. When undertaking new work for a client, McKinsey 
were used to studying an issue, making an assessment, and coming up with 
recommendations, before usually being asked to implement them. Here, the new 
administrative structure of the NHS had already been settled and was outside the remit of the 
study group. Banham and others were able to look back later and see that the arrangements 
were flawed, but it had already been apparent to some observers at the time. Even if Stewart-
Smith and others suspected that the structures might not work, they could do little about it. 
Some observers were even clear that a further significant reorganisation was inevitable at 
some point.105 The failure to undertake pilot studies before committing to such significant 
reforms has come to be seen as another shortcoming, one which has been repeated in the 
course of subsequent NHS reforms. Stewart-Smith recalls: 
 
I went to Sir Keith Joseph and said, ‘Look, we have got a problem with these two 
aspects and in particular the cost of the structure and the fact we are not piloting 
anything’. And he [Joseph] said, ‘I have decided what we are going to do’, and he 
gave me all the reasons why he believed in management and planning and all 
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these things that people believed in at that time, and he said that if we did not 
want to do the job, basically he would find somebody else to do it. I took the view 
that McKinsey were very good at doing this sort of thing so they could do it but I 
was not going to be part of it.106  
 
As a result, Stewart-Smith stepped down from the project and was replaced as 
Engagement Manager by Roderick Taylor. Although some ‘trials’ of the study group’s 
‘tentative hypotheses’ were held in a number of areas, a wider pilot study of the 
reorganisation was not attempted.107 Concerns about the direction of the policymaking 
process had also been raised by figures like Meyjes, who resigned from the steering 
committee and the study group in March 1972 once it became clear that more ambitious 
proposals for reform based around greater autonomy for a central director-general and 
regional chief executives would not be taken up and the organisational path established by 
Crossman would be followed.108 
In addition, the wider management solution that McKinsey might have been 
instinctively most comfortable proposing based on their experience at Oxford in 1968, did 
not fit with the direction the study was likely to take. The 1971 McKinsey team had to 
compromise with civil servants, administrators and medical professionals – the other 
members of the study group and the steering committee – and work within the parameters 
that they set. There was no scope to revisit the recommendations of the Consultative 
Document on the structure of the NHS. Williams later reflected positively that ‘They 
[McKinsey] were quick to appreciate what were the practical possibilities taking account of 
the attitudes of the various health service professions and also flexible enough to amend their 
original organisational hypothesis quite radically’.109 Compromise was one of the defining 
features of the reorganisation as a whole. A decision-making process that was designed by 
civil servants to have so many different voices feeding into it, was always likely to find a 
middle way. Consensus management was the result. According to Caines, civil servants 
effectively controlled the process and steered it to a satisfactory, at least in the short term, 
conclusion: 
 
We were prepared with catchphrases: consensus management, delegation 
downwards, accountability upwards. They all tripped off the tongue nicely. 
They accorded with the flavour of what the Steering Committee felt about how 
it should be run…When we went there we knew what we wanted and we knew 
what we were giving them. It went relatively smoothly as far as I am 
concerned.110  
 
 
Value for Money 
 
Securing value for money when using consultants was a key concern. This is clear 
from a debate in 1972 about whether McKinsey should be kept on for Stage III of the 
management study. At the beginning of the study CSD’s Archer had advised his DHSS 
colleagues that ‘the more senior McKinsey people represent value for their high fees but the 
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more junior consultants, often just out of business school, do not’.111 The per diem rate for 
Strage as Engagement Director was £229. For his most junior colleague it was £104. Similar 
trade-offs between experience and cost continue today. Although the project ran to budget, 
the sceptical civil servant S. Bayfield, who had been part of the study group, pointed out that 
the cost of one McKinsey representative was the same as three under-secretaries: ‘Viewed 
impartially and looking at the calibre of the personnel on the team this is very poor value for 
money’.112 
Having invested in McKinsey at Stage I and II, it was a point of contention whether it 
made sense financially to continue with them for Stage III. Williams was among those who 
thought they should be brought back: 
 
I am sure that if we discontinued the assignment at the end of July we should 
not yet have got optimum value out of our investment. In any case we need to 
get a rather larger nucleus of DHSS Officers than at present familiar with the 
study and its concepts in order to carry the Study through without loss of 
impetus once the McKinsey team…have left.113 
 
Bayfield was less sure: 
 
As a general rule it is advisable to use consultants for the shortest possible time to 
the maximum possible effect and they are particularly strong on conceptual 
proposals but I suspect very weak on applications because of their total lack of 
experience in background.114 
 
Considerable thought was also given to whether sufficient knowledge and manpower 
was available within DHSS. John Orme argued that ‘McKinseys have done and are doing 
well; and that we shall be the losers if we cut away from them’.115 Bayfield and others 
remained unconvinced, recognising the logic of bringing McKinsey back, but suggesting that 
a team of DHSS or NHS officers would be better placed to undertake the work needed in the 
next phase. As Bayfield noted, ‘They are constantly exposing the inadequacy of their 
background and experience and to involve them [in Stage III] is in my view 
misconceived’.116 
The issue of how close the relationship between external consultants and health 
policymakers should become was also recognised in 1972 by Kenneth Stowe, Assistant 
Under Secretary of State in DHSS, and later Permanent Secretary: ‘McKinsey’s have now 
had three successive major assignments and it is undesirable, as a matter of good practice, to 
develop a semi-permanent relationship with one firm’.117 There were also contemporary 
concerns about the impact on service efficiency. As Bayfield cautioned: 
 
If the provision of manpower can only be obtained by using McKinseys, then we 
must accept the disadvantages of using inexperienced people for practical 
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applications which require substantial experience. In the long run this may turn 
out to be more damaging to the efficiency of the service than one would wish.118 
 
With the balance amongst civil servants against retaining McKinsey in full for Phase III but 
continuing concerns about the impact on the timetable for reorganisation planning, it was 
decided to try and equip civil servants with the right knowledge and experience and wind 
down the firm’s involvement, phasing it out by the end of 1972. The final McKinsey work, 
with only Banham and Lee retained in reduced roles, was seen as an extension of Phase II 
rather than a move to Phase III.  
In the end, influenced by the wider economic crises of the 1970s, perhaps even 
subconsciously, McKinsey did not actively seek further consultancy work in the British 
health sector for a time after 1973.119 They later returned strongly, alongside their peers, 
during the 1980s and 1990s as part of a significant expansion in consultancy activity 
underpinned by wider managerial and governance related changes – a period described by 
Klein as a ‘gold rush’. 120  Important opportunities were provided by the rolling out of NHS 
Trust status during the early 1990s, the subsequent development of ‘turnaround teams’ 
brought in to help Trusts that found themselves in financial difficulty during the early 2000s, 
and the  development of NHS IT systems over seen by Department of Health agencies like 
‘Connecting for Health’. From relatively humble beginnings therefore, management 
consultants have steadily become culturally embedded in British health policymaking. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The 1974 reorganisation represents an important moment in the ongoing story of 
management consultants engaging with British health policymakers. It marked the first time 
that consultants had been engaged on a project of such importance in the healthcare field. 
They now play a significant role throughout the NHS and across Whitehall. In 2013-14 NHS 
spending on management consultants reached a peak of £640 million. Though this figure has 
since fallen back, to £371m in 2017-18, and represents a relatively small component of the 
total NHS budget of around £125bn, the underlying implications are significant. 121 Many 
debates about the use of external consultants today were already apparent during McKinsey’s 
involvement in the 1974 NHS reorganisation. By the early 1970s consultants had been 
engaging with health policymakers for some time. McKinsey were a high profile firm and 
their healthcare experience, though not yet extensive, was well known. Their engagement in 
the management study was significant. It speaks to the emerging role of consultants in health 
policymaking, particularly as a response to a perceived lack of specialist knowledge or 
sufficient manpower inside the civil service and the NHS. 
Nonetheless, although their contribution to the reorganisation was important in a 
number of respects, McKinsey were only one of the expert groups feeding into the process. 
The management study was structured so that different voices would be heard. This 
constrained the McKinsey representatives and steered the participants towards a compromise.  
Although the firm has come to be closely associated with the reorganisation and its failure, 
the analysis presented here suggests that this not need necessarily have been the case. For 
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example, in 1975 a critique noted that ‘Management experts who understand little medical 
care were given free reign’. 122 This was not strictly true, but it chimed with some medical 
practitioners’ beliefs. Since then it has become convenient shorthand, particularly in the wake 
of subsequent controversial reforms, to link 1974 to the McKinsey brand. 
This article has not sought to challenge the established historical assessment of the 
1974 NHS reorganisation as an unsuccessful exercise. Rather, the objective has been to focus 
on management consultants and better understand the process by which it was brought about, 
the wider context and powerful institutional and professional cultures, and the roles played 
by different policy actors. Archival sources and the discussions at the witness seminar held in 
November 2016 have created a richer picture and allow for a nuanced assessment of the 
reforms. 
The 1974 reorganisation was a product of its time, particularly the desire for 
modernisation and rationalisation in the planning of public services. However, its defining 
characteristics were ultimately pragmatism and compromise. This was likely unavoidable. 
Civil servants and government ministers were acutely aware of the need to accommodate key 
interest groups, not least those inside the NHS who would have to make the new 
arrangements work, particularly the medical profession. As Klein describes, ‘The search for 
an organisational solution to the NHS’s problems can therefore be best understood as policy-
making under constraints, where the ideal was often seen as the enemy of the feasible: the 
politics of the second-best’.123 We can only speculate whether a more hard-headed and 
divisive approach that attempted to push through a more integrated service would have been 
more successful and long lasting. In the event, the NHS Gordian knot remained uncut. 
Some of the flaws in the tripartite structure that had been in place since 1948 were 
addressed, and it is likely that the better organisation and co-ordination which resulted 
ultimately led to improvements in patient care. As discussed, by the late 1960s the pressure 
for reform had built such that it could not be put off any longer. For some NHS staff, 
particularly those who were well prepared and amenable, the reorganisation was not 
disruptive, and may even have worked well. But the new structures and processes did not suit 
everyone. They also produced new layers of bureaucracy and introduced new problems 
which had to be overcome. Full integration, which many academic observers believed was 
necessary, was not achieved; indeed it was not aimed for. In effect policymakers were 
attempting ‘to make substance from shadows’.124 
Nonetheless, many of those who were directly involved in the reorganisation, whether 
through the study group and the steering committee of the management study, or on the 
ground in the NHS, saw problems ahead before the reforms even took effect. There was 
recognition that the expected cost savings were unlikely to be realised or that the required 
managerial efficiency would be generated. Many of the ‘mistakes’ that were made – over-
prescription and direction from the centre, unnecessary bureaucracy, a lack of certainty about 
where ultimate responsibility lay, inadequate piloting – now appear explicable, if not 
excusable. Ultimately however, this speaks to the poor institutional memory of Whitehall, 
and the Department of Health and Social Care in particular. When significant changes are not 
well planned and well implemented there is negative impact on resources, staff morale and 
service delivery.  
The 1974 NHS reorganisation demonstrates the extent to which British health 
policymakers have had to work within cultural, political, legislative and practical constraints 
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when trying to initiate change. In 1974 McKinsey were not yet performing the wide ranging 
and controversial role in the health sphere that management consultants would take on in 
future, particularly from the 1980s and 1990s as managerial and market-oriented reforms 
were introduced and a normative culture which facilitated a significant role for external 
consultants developed. But their involvement in the 1974 reforms speaks directly to ongoing 
questions about the ways in which consultants come to be hired by health policymakers 
(often through reputation or established relationships), the quality of their work, the 
perceived lack of expertise inside the civil service and the NHS, and the ways in which they 
appear to legitimise  decision making processes. McKinsey were seen as managerial experts 
in the early 1970s. Ultimately however, the 1974 NHS reorganisation was defined by 
practical rather than philosophical considerations, and external management experts could 
make only a limited contribution to an imperfect compromise. 
